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COMMENTS
MEXICAN DIVORCE-A SURVEY
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1806, when Nancy Jackson asked a New York court to enforce a Vermont
alimony decree, the case' touched off a spate of oratory by opposing counsel
which has a strangely modem ring. The alimony decree was part of a divorce
obtained by Nancy during a sojourn in Vermont. Her husband had apppeared
by counsel. Her attorney contended: "The downicil of the parties is imma-
terial. It is sufficient that they were within the jurisdiction of the court .... 21
His adversary declared: "Here is a conflictio Icgum, and it remains to be
decided, whether, in a matter of so much consequence to the morality and
happiness of the people, we are to be governed by the laws of another state,
or by those of our own.?3
The court refused to enforce the alimony decree noting that the plaintiff,
a domiciliary of New York, had obtained a divorce on grounds not allowed
in New York (ill treatment and bad temper), and that since she had acted
"with a view of evading our laws, it would be attended with pernicious con-
sequences to aid this attempt to elude them."-'
One hundred and fifty-nine years later, New York retains its solitary divorce
ground.0 But, under its own decisions,0 and because of the policy laid down
by the Supreme Court of the United States, a New York court would today
recognize the Vermont decree as prima fade valid and Nancy's husband,
because of his appearance, would be precluded from atta-cdng it.7 Thus, it
might seem that the questions raised in the case are of merely historical
1. Jackson v. JacLson, I Johns. R. 424 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. KE06). This case has bccn called
the "first instance recorded in American reports of what has come to be a frequent
conflict between the claim of the individual to be freed from a marriage tie which, to
him or to her, has become intolerable, and the claim of the state, acting v.-ithin the
powers reserved to it, to control the circumstances and the procedure affecting the termi-
nation of the marital status of its domidliaries." Merrill, The Utility of Divorce Rccog n-
tion Statutes in Dealing with the Problem of Migratory Divorce, 27 Texas L. Rev. 291-
92 (1949).
2. Jackson v. Jackson, supra note 1, at 430.
3. Id. at 425-26.
4. Id. at 432. It has been pointed out that the court in Jackson v.as careful not to
base its decision on jurisdictional grounds and that the validity of the Vermont divorce
was not the point in issue. The explanation offered is that the doctrine of domicile as
forming the jurisdictional base for the dissolution of marriage had not yet been formu-
lated and that general policy considerations were more important to the court than
the jurisdictional ones. Howe, The Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees in New
York State, 40 Colum. L. Rev. 373, 3S2-93 (1940).
S. N.Y. Dom. ReL Law § 170.
6. See, e.g., Kinnier v. Kinnier, 45 N.Y. 535 (1S71), in which the JacLson dedion was
expressly disapproved.
7. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 US. 343 (1948).
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interest. However, substitution of "Mexico" for "Vermont" in the arguments
of counsel gives the case vitality and points up a conflict currently of more
than passing interest to many.8
In New York, the state's highest court is only now being called upon to
decide the effect of a Mexican decree in an action in which one party ap-
peared physically and the other by counsel. In three other states,9 this type
of divorce has been held invalid. And in many other states the question has
never been squarely put to the courts.
It is still possible to ask: Is domicile material when viewing the effect of
a divorce obtained in a foreign country where jurisdictional concepts are to-
tally different from ours?
II. GENERAL CONSEDERATIONS
Traditional notions of jurisdiction in matrimonial actions in this country
are based on the idea that the marriage status is a res over which the state
has a special interest and control. 10 Thus, a suit for divorce is a three-party
action in which the state is always involved.'
Jurisdiction of the subject matter in a divorce action is generally considered
to be twofold. Not only must the court be empowered to hear the type of
question presented, but it also must have jurisdiction over the marital status
of the persons involved, a jurisdiction which is completely separate and dis-
tinct from jurisdiction over the persons themselves.' 2 Though the twofold
nature of subject matter jurisdiction is the orthodox and by far most generally
accepted theory, it is by no means unanimously followed."
The traditional statutory requisite for jurisdiction over a marital status
8. According to the New York Times, an estimated 200,000 New Yorkers alone
have obtained Mexican divorces. N.Y. Times, July 8, 1964, p. 34, col. 2.
9. New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio.
10. See 2 Bishop, New Commentaries on Marriage, Divorce & Separation § 489 (4th ed.
1891); 11 Am. Jur. Conflict of Laws § 16 (1937).
11. People v. Dawell, 25 Mich. 247, 257, 12 Am. Rep. 260, 268 (1872): "[Tjhere are
three parties to every divorce proceeding-the husband, the wife, and the State; the
first two parties representing their respective interests as individuals; the State con-
cerned to guard the morals of its citizens, by taking care that neither by collusion nor
otherwise, shall divorce be allowed under such circumstances as to reduce marriage to
a mere temporary arrangement of conscience or passion."
12. One textwriter phrases the test for jurisdiction this way: "Has the particular
court power to entertain and adjudicate actions and controversies of the particular kind
or type? and . . . does such residence or domicile exist within its territorial jurisdiction as
to meet statutory requirements in this respect?" 2A Nelson, Divorce & Annulment § 21.01,
at 294 (2d ed. 1961). (Emphasis added.)
13. Ibid. For a discussion of the development of the status theory of marriage,
see Howe, supra note 4, at 390-93. The author points out that there were at least two
other theories which influenced the development of the law of divorce: the contract
theory, whereby the state in which the marriage was performed was deemed to be the
one qualified to dissolve it; and the penal theory, under which the place where the
wrong against the marriage was committed was deemed the proper forum for dissolution.
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has been domicile.' 4 As the law moved away from the idea that a wife could
not have a domicile separate from that of her husband,15 the plaintiff in a
divorce action was deemed to carry the status of both parties so that it could
be acted upon by the state of his (or her) domicile1 3 As distinguished from
residence, domicile encompasses the intent to make that place a permanent
abode.' 7 Even where statutes use the word "residence" to describe the juris-
dictional requisite for suit, the word generally is construed to embrace the
concept of permanence.,
In a frequently quoted dictum,'9 Mr. Justice Frankfurter restated the rule
that domicile is the predicate for jurisdiction of the subject matter in a mat-
rimonial action: "Under our system of law, judicial power to grant a divorce-
jurisdiction, strictly speaking-is founded on domicile .... The framers of
the Constitution were familiar with this jurisdictional prerequisite, and since
1789 neither this Court nor any other court in the English-spealing world has
questioned it." 0 It is generally agreed that where domicile is not the basis
of a court's assumption of jurisdiction no divorce can validly be granted -
and furthermore, that parties cannot artificially create a domicile for divorce
purposes "by voluntarily submitting their marital tie for dissolution?"-
14. Domicile has been defined as "that place where a man has his true, fixed, and
permanent home and principal establishment, and to which whenever he is absent be
has the intention of returning." Black, Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951).
15. See Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U.S. 103, 124 (1869).
16. See 2 Bishop, op. cit. supra note 10, § 121.
17. In Wheat v. Wheat, 229 Ark. 342, 313 SAV.2d 793 (1953), the Supreme Court of
Arkansas, passing on the constitutionality of a 1957 statute in which "reaidence" for
three months prior to suit was deemed domicile for the purpose5 of the lavs of divorce.
said: "[T]he legislature has substituted the simple requirement of three months residence,
which can be proved with certainty, for the nebulous concept of domicile, which usually
cannot be proved. We concede that the period of residence might be shortened so un-
reasonably... as to indicate that the state has no reasonable basis for exerci ing jurisdic-
tion over the marriage." Id. at 350, 313 SAV.2d at 797. The court noted further that
divorces granted pursuant to this statute, albeit constitutional in Arkansas, might well be
refused recognition by sister states despite the fuli faith and credit clause.
13. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 9, comment e (1934).
19. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
20. Id. at 229. In addition to the dissents in this case which most seriously questioned
the "ghost of unitary domicile," particularly the dissent of Mr. Justice Rutledge, id. at
244, other commentators have urged the adoption of a jurisdictional predicate based
on the physical presence of the plaintiff in the divorcing forum. See Stimson, Jurdiction
in Divorce Cases: The Unsoundness of the Domiciliary Theory, 42 A.BAJ. 222 (1956).
For a discusson of domicile in other parts of the "English-spealting world," see Mount-
batten v. Mountbatten, [1959] 1 All E.R. 99 (Ch.), in which a bilateral Mexican decree
was held to be invalid in England.
21. 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws 463 (1935); Goodrich, Handbook of the Conflict of
Laws 396 (3d ed. 1949); Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 111 (1934). But see N.Y. Dom.
Rel. Law § 170 (2) which states that a New York court has jurisdiction over the marital
status if the parties were married in New York.
22. 2A Nelson, op. cit. supra note 12, § 21.09, at 307. See also Jennings v. Jennings, 251
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These ideas are the basis for Supreme Court decisions forming the policy
governing sister-state decrees. According to these decisions, an ex parte di-
vorce decree from a sister state is prima facie valid23 though there may be
inquiry into jurisdictional facts.24 The burden of attacking such a decree,
however, "rests heavily on the assailant."25 Participation by a party in the
action, either by appearance or entrance of a cross-petition, 7 will preclude
him from attacking the decree. Third parties also will be precluded where
those through whom they claim are precluded or where an attack would be
barred in 'the rendering state.28 The overriding consideration of the Court,
especially in cases where both parties have taken part, has been uniformity of
recognition of divorce decrees throughout the United States.2 9
III. MEXICAN DIVORCE GENERALLY
The full faith and credit clause of the Constitution governs the recognition
of sister-state decrees. Under principles of comity, 30 recognition of decrees
granted by courts of other countries is considered to be less a rule of law than
a rule of practice "carrying with it no implication of relinquishment of sov-
ereignty." 3' Most states, however, regard Mexican 82 divorces in the same light
as those of sister states. All are in agreement that mail-order decrees 3 are
Ala. 73, 74, 36 So. 2d 236, 237-38 (1948), where the court said: "[Ult is recognized that
unless one of the parties has a residence or domicile within the state, the parties cannot even
by consent confer jurisdiction on the courts of that state to grant a divorce."
23. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
24. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
25. Id. at 234.
26. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
27. Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
28. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
29. See majority opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Williams v. North Carolina, 317
U.S. 287, 301 (1942).
30. Comity has been defined as "that body of rules which states observe towards
one another from courtesy or mutual convenience .... " Black, Law Dictionary (4th ed.
1951).
31. 15 C.J.S. Conflict of Laws § 3, at 837-38 (1939).
32. Since Mexico is a Republic composed of twenty-nine states, several territories, and
a Federal District, each of which has its own laws, it is more proper to refer directly to
the place in Mexico where the divorce was granted. Like the United States, Mexico has
its "liberal" jurisdictions, and it is to these states that most Americans flock for their
migratory divorces. Most popular among them is Chihuahua, which a person can enter
by crossing the International Bridge from El Paso, Texas. The majority of New York
cases deal with Chihuahua divorces. Other states which attract the quickie-divorce seeker
are Campeche, Sonora, Tlaxcala, and Morelos. For purposes of simplification they wili be
referred to here at times as "Mexican" divorces, though this practice has caused com-
ment in Mexico. See Siqueiros, Los Conflictos de Leyes en el Sistema Constitudional Mex-
cano 80 (1957).
33. I.e., granted in an action in which neither party appears physically and both submit
to the jurisdiction of the court.
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legal nullities.3 It is clearly offensive to the policy of all states to recognize
a decree granted by a forum in which neither party has ever been present and
in which no tie with the marriage has ever been acquired.
Similarly, Mexican ex parte decrees are uniformly subjected to scrutiny
on the question of domicile. Where a sufficient basis for a finding of domicile
is demonstrated, the decrees are upheld.35 Where this jurisdictional requisite
is missing, the decrees are denied effect.30
The point of departure among the states comes with the so-called bilateral
decree.37 Only four states3 s have had the validity of a bilateral Mexican di-
vorce put squarely before their courts. New York forms a minority of one in
consistently upholding the validity of such a divorce, although neither party
was domiciled in Mexico, so long as the Mexican court has acquired personal
jurisdiction over the parties.
IV. THm MAjorry VIw
Each of the three statess9 forming the "majority" view regarding bilateral
Mexican divorces has only one such reported case. In each instance the court
found the divorce offensive to its public policy, and this consideration out-
weighed both the deference due a foreign court's decree under principles of
comity and the principles of estoppel40 which could have been raised.4 1
34. See, e.g., Christopher v. Christopher, 193 Ga. 361, 31 S.E.2d 313 (1944); Bergeron
v. Bergeron, 237 Mlass. 524, 192 N.E. 36 (1934); Tonti v. Chadwick, 1 N.J. 531, 64 A.2d
436 (1949); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146, 31 N.E.2d 60 (1943); Smith v. Smith,
50 N.E.2d S9 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943). It should be noted that in certain cascs mail-order
decrees have had some limited effect. See, e.g., Sears v. Sears, 293 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir.
1961); Unruh v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Ariz. 113, 301 P.2d 1029 (1956); In the Matter
of Rathscheck, 300 N.Y. 346, 90 N.E.2d S37 (1950); Harlan v. Harlan, 70 Cal. App. 2d
657, 161 P.2d 490 (Dist. Ct. App. 1945). In Harlan and Sears, invalid mail-order divorces
could not be impeached by a party to the original suit.
35. Scott v. Scott, 51 Cal. 2d 249, 331 P.2d 641 (1953); De Young v. De Young, 27 Cal.
2d 521, 165 P.2d 457 (1946); Imbrioscia v. Quayle, 197 Misc. 1049, 96 N.Y.S2d 63S (Sup.
Ct. 1950), revd on other grounds, 278 App. Div. 144, 103 N.YS.2d 593 (Ist Dep't 1951).
36. Harrison v. Harrison, 214 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1954); Bethune v. Bethune, 192 Ark.
811, 94 S.W.2d 1043 (1936); Estate of Edgett, 10 Cal. Rptr. 552 (Dist. CL App. 1961);
Bonner v. Reandrew, 203 Iov.-a 1355, 214 N.W. 536 (1927); Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum,
309 N.Y. 371, 130 N.E.2d 902 (1955); Davis v. Davis, 156 N.E.2d 494 (C.P. Ohio 1959).
37. Here, either both parties are before the court, or one party is physically prezent
and the other appears by counsel. See Ploscowe, Mexican Divorcezs-When Are They
Valid? 36 N.Y.S.B.J. 201 (1964).
3S. New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio.
39. New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio.
40. No attempt will be made here to discuss the tangential area of the application
of estoppel in matrimonial actions. This is an area about which a great deal has bcen
written and which remains "in a confused and unsettled state." Ro.enstiel v. Ro:enstiel,
21 App. Div. 2d 635, 639, 253 N.Y.S.2d 206, 210 (1st Dcp't 1964) (Valente, J., concur-
ring). For a discussion of estoppel in divorces obtained without domicile, sce Note, 61
Harv. L. Rev. 326 (1948).
41. In each case, a party in the original action was allowed to impeach the validity
of the divorce.
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The first of these cases was Golden v. Golden,42 decided by the New Mexico
Supreme Court in 1937. There, husband and wife drove from Tucumcari, New
Mexico, to El Paso, Texas, left their car on the American side of the Inter-
national Bridge, and walked into Ciudad Juarez, State of Chihuahua. After
a brief visit with a lawyer, they signed some papers, and later that same day
were handed their divorce papers. Neither their physical presence in Mexico
nor their submission to the Chihuahua court's jurisdiction impressed the New
Mexico court. It declared: "Neither of the parties had established a 'residence'
in Juarez, under any known definition of residence. They went to Juarez,
Mex., for one sole purpose, to secure a decree of divorce, and then depart ....
They might just as well have transacted the entire proceedings by phone or
mail from Tucumcari, N. Mex., and have saved the all night drive, in so
far as the efficacy of their efforts amounted to the establishment of a residence
in Mexico for the purpose of securing a divorce." 43
Quoting with approval a statement in a California mail-order case,44 the
court pointed out that regardless of whether the requirements of Mexican
law were met, the lack of domicile in the divorcing forum meant lack of
jurisdiction to grant a decree that would be recognized in New Mexico: "[T] h e
state of Chihuahua and the Republic of Mexico have the undoubted right to
make such laws for the government of their own inhabitants as they may
deem proper, and the courts of that state have the right to render judgments
and decrees pursuant to such laws, fixing the rights, relations, and status of
their citizens, but when such judgments or decrees, which affect or purport
to determine the marital status and rights of citizens of this state, are con-
trary to the public policy of this state, our courts will determine for themselves
the jurisdiction of that court to render such a decree . . .,,4
A few years later, an Ohio court spoke in much the same terms in allowing
a wife who had appealed a Mexican decree in the Mexican courts to impeach
the validity of the divorce in her home state. In Bobala v. Bobala,40 husband,
after starting an action for divorce in Ohio, began a proceeding in Chihuahua.
In spite of a restraining order from the Ohio court, he continued his Mexican
action and subsequently obtained a divorce. His wife, through counsel, prose-
cuted an appeal in Mexico which was denied, and then brought suit for
divorce in Ohio. Although the alleged fraud perpetrated on the Ohio court
by the husband in flaunting its jurisdiction undoubtedly played a part in
the decision of the court of appeals, the court made a special point of the
jurisdictional aspect of the case. It stated: "Jurisdiction is prescribed by
law and can not be increased or diminished by the consent of the parties,
and where there is want of jurisdiction of the subject matter a judgment
without jurisdiction is void . . . and it cannot be doubted that if the Mexican
42. 41 N2M. 356, 68 P.2d 928 (1937).
43. Id. at 364, 68 P.2d at 933.
44. Ryder v. Ryder, 2 Cal. App. 2d 426, 37 P.2d 1069 (1934).
45. 41 N.M. at 368, 68 P.2d at 935.
46. 68 Ohio App. 63, 33 N.E.2d 845 (1940).
[Vol. 33
court had no jurisdiction due to non-residence of appellant the decree could
in no case affect the marriage status of these parties in Ohio."47 Noting that
the lower court had entertained the wife's divorce action in spite of her par-
ticipation in the Mlexican divorce proceedings, the court of appeals stated
dearly that the lower court "was fully justified in its refusal to respect the
decree in Mexico due to the Jact that appellant had not acquired a bona fide
residence in Mexico! "4s
The most recent decision of this type was handed down in New Jersey in
1963. In Warrender v. Warrender,49 the plaintiff was not estopped from attack-
ing a Chihuahua divorce obtained by her in a suit in which her husband
had appeared by counsel. Calling the decree "absolutely void on its face '7zO
the court noted that there was not even a pretense of either residence or domi-
cile in the decree. It cited a number of mail-order cases in support of the
proposition that the public policy of the state was offended by such a decree.
Like the court in Golden, it refused to recognize a difference between the
bilateral decree and a mail-order divorce, despite the acquisition by the
Mlexican court of personal jurisdiction over the parties.
Each of these decisions stands today as the law of its state. Each reflects
the attitude of the majority of states concerning the role of the state in
governing marriage and its dissolution-a role which precludes recognition
of a patently collusive decree based on fleeting contacts with a divorcing
forum that has no interest in the marriage status of foreigners.
V. THE MiNornny VIw--NEw Yome
New York's attitude, on the other hand, is one of indifference to the juris-
dictional elements which so offend its sister states62 So long as the decree
recites that the jurisdictional requirements of the forum have been met and
so long as the court had personal jurisdiction over the parties, New York has,
since 1938, consistently refused to look behind the decree to determine whether
bona fide residence or domicile existed. It has been suggested that the status
theory of marriage, with its corresponding jurisdictional requirement based on
domicile, has never fully been accepted in New York 3 This theory would
seem to be borne out by the cases construing Mexican bilateral divorces.
47. Id. at 71, 33 .E.2d at 349.
48. Id. at 72, 33 N.E.2d at 349. (Emphasis added.) Here, as is generally the care, the
court used the word "residence" in the sense of domicile.
49. 79 N.J. Super. 114, 190 A.2d 634 (App. Div. 1963), aff'd, 42 N.J. 2S7, 20 A2d 123
(1964).
50. Id. at 113, 190 A.2d at 636.
51. State v. De Meo, 20 NJ. 1, 11S A.2d 1 (1955); State v. 'Nafjar, 2 'N .J. 203, 65
A.2d 37 (1949) (per curiam); Tonti v. Chadwick, 1 N.J. 531, 64 A.2d 436 (1949); Flar-
mia v. Mailer, 66 N.J. Super. 440, 169 A.2d 43S (App. Div. 1961).
52. See Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 21 App. Div. 2d 635, 253 N.Y.S.2d 206 (Ist Dep't 1964).
53. Howe, The Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees in New York State, 40 Colum.
L. Rev. 373 (1940).
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In the first of these cases, Leviton v. Leviton,5 4 both parties to the Mexican
divorce were physically present in Chihuahua, defendant was personally served
there, and the judgment recited that they were Mexican domiciliaries (though
the entire transaction took less than twenty-four hours). In upholding the
validity of the divorce 5 the court said: "The Mexican law respecting residence
has been followed. The establishment of a domicile or residence in the strict
sense is a question both of intent and act. The parties acted; we must accept
the Mexican court's conclusion upon their intent."50 Refusing to find a differ-
ence between this decree and one granted in Nevada, the court declared: "We
may disagree with the law of Mexico or Nevada establishing rules for resi-
dence. We may even disapprove them as expressing theories repugnant to our
own standards, as applied to corresponding litigation initiated within this
state. It does not follow that we should disturb a decree entered either in
Nevada or Mexico if it complies with the requirements of their statutes, for
we then say that the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the
parties, and thus was competent to act.' 'sr This treatment of a divorce action,
in much the same manner as though it were an ordinary contract suit, transitory
in nature, 58 in substance followed earlier divorce cases involving sister states. 9
In Matter of Fleiscker0 the court spoke in terms of the marital res, but
adopted the Leviton reasoning. "Essentially, the facts here, as in the Leviton
case . . . present a situation where one of the parties to a marriage, with the
consent of the other expressed by voluntary appearance, took the marital res
out of this State to invoke a foreign jurisdiction. The jurisdictional fact of
domicile . . . is not open to attack unless the public policy of our State in-
tervenes to deny recognition to the decree of a foreign country which followed
upon the submission of both parties to that jurisdiction."'O The court noted
54. 6 N.Y.S.2d 535 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd & modified mem. 254 App. Div. 670, 4 N.Y.S.2d 992
(1st Dep't 1938).
55. Strictly speaking, the New York court upheld a divorce of Mexican domiclilarles,
since it refused to relitigate the question of whether the parties had the requisite Intent
for domicile and accepted the Mexican court's characterization of the parties.
56. 6 N.Y.S.2d at 537. (Emphasis added.)
57. Id. at 538.
58. The orthodox view is that a suit for divorce is local in nature. "The subject-matter
of a divorce suit is just as much local as the subject-matter of a suit in ejectment. It Is
the status of the parties, permitted, regulated and controlled by the law of their domicile,
which is to be passed upon and determined; and the appearance of the parties in a foreign
jurisdiction does nothing whatever toward transferring this subject-matter." People v.
Dawell, 25 Mich. 247, 264, 12 Am. Rep. 260, 273 (1872).
59. Gould v. Gould, 235 N.Y. 14, 138 N.E. 490 (1923), which stated that a divorce not
based on domicile could be recognized in comity if it were not offensive to the state's
public policy; Glaser v. Glaser, 276 N.Y. 296, 12 N.E.2d 305 (1938), which declared that
leaving the state for the purpose of obtaining a divorce was not offensive to the public
policy of the state.
60. 192 Misc. 777, 80 N.Y.S.2d 543 (Surr. Ct. 1948).
61. Id. at 781, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 546.
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that the public policy of the state was not offended by the fact that the parties
left New York for the purpose of obtaining a divorce.'
In contrast to the single decisions standing in the three other statesP
New York courts have been called upon to decide the validity of dozens of
Mexican divorces. In many of these cases the jurisdictional question is not
discussed at all or is accepted flatly on the basis of comity.- It is interesting
to note that estoppel is rarely an issue in the New York cases,cs mainly be-
cause the courts do not reach the question. Where the issue is raised, it is
often summarily dismissed, as in Laff v. Laff," where the court stated: "While
plaintiff's active participation in this matter and the conduct of the parties
with respect to the defendant's Mexican divorce action does not commend
itself to the court, the plaintiff's conduct would not estop him from obtaining
the annulment he seeks if, in fact, the lexican decree were invalid."67
Before 1963, only two cases held bilateral Mexican divorces invalid, both
because defendants lacked adequate representation by counsel. In Molnar v.
Molnar, s the husband, who was the defendant in the Mexican divorce pro-
ceeding, signed a power of attorney in the office of his wife's lawyer. The
court held that he did not have the benefit of disinterested legal advice and
further, "did not understand the nature and effect of the power of attorney
which he signed.. . ."G9 Thus, he never voluntarily appeared in the Mexican
court. To this extent, the decision is consistent with the others following
Leviton. However, the court in dictum took pains to state what, in effect, is
the majority view: "Even if the power of attorney were valid, I would still
hold that the Mexican divorce decree was invalid. I can see no distinction
between this case and ...a Mexican 'mail-order' divorce. Neither of these
parties ever had even a colorable residence in Mexico and the divorce decree
62. Id. at 732, S0 N.Y.S.2d at 547.
63. See note 3S ssupra.
64. See, e~g., Weibel v. Weibel, 37 Misc. 2d 162, 234 N.Y.S.2d 293 (Sup. CL 1962);
Heine v. Heine, 231 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct. 1962), aff'd mem. 19 App. Div. 2d 695, 242
N.Y.S.2d 705 (2d Dep't 1963); Skolnick v. Skolnich, 24 Mic. 2d 1077, 204 N.Y.S2d 63
(Sup. Ct. 1960); Fricke v. Bechtold, 3 Misc. 2d S44, 163 N.Y.S.2d 197 (Sup. Ct. 1957);
Costi v. Costi, 133 N.Y.S.2d 447 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
65. But see Mountain v. Mountain, 109 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Sup. CL 1951), where a subza-
quent spouse was precluded from attacking his wife's prior lexican divorce because he
was aware of the facts surrounding it before his own marriage.
66. 5 Asc. 2d 554, 160 N.Y.S.2d 933, aff'd mem. 4 App. Div. 2d S74, 166 N.Y.S2d 678
(2d Dep't 1957).
67. 5 Misc. 2d at 556, 160 N.Y.S.2d at 935. In contrast to the New York approach,
California tends to apply a broad theory of estoppel. Thus, even though admitting that
the divorce in question is invalid per se, it often will not allow an attack to be made
on it. See, e.g., Harlan v. Harlan, 70 Cal. App. 2d 657, 161 P.2d 490 (Dist CL App. 1945).
For a discussion of the California courts' approach to estoppel in foreign divorce, sce Note,
16 Hastings LJ. 121 (1964).
6S. 131 N.Y.S.2d 120 (Sup. Ct), aff'd mem. 284 App. Div. 948, 135 N.YS.2d 623
(1st Dep't 1954).
69. Id. at 121.
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is patently invalid. If we were to permit a divorce decree such as this to stand,
we might just as well permit dissolution of the marriage by agreement of the
parties" 7 0 Two years later, in MacPherson v. MacPherson,71 a bilateral decree
was struck down where it was found that although the wife signed a paper
authorizing her husband to get an attorney and "defend" for her in Mexico,
he never communicated to her the name of the attorney who, in fact, did
not defend but merely confessed judgment.
The two decisions, however, that caused considerable comment in New York,
came in cases having somewhat similar fact patterns resulting in similar
holdings by two New York supreme court judges. Both decisions were based,
not on the usual recital of presumption of jurisdiction by the Mexican court
plus an acknowledgment that both parties were represented by counsel, but
surprisingly, on the traditional view that since in neither case had there in
fact been any sort of residence, much less domicile, the Mexican decrees were
void. In Wood v. Wood 72 the Mexican divorce was admittedly obtained under
a section of the Chihuahua law which based the jurisdiction of the court on
the submission of the parties.78 Though granting that the divorce was valid in
Mexico, 74 Judge Coleman declared that such a decree was contrary to New
York's public policy: "The State must have 'jurisdiction' before it can act;
it cannot be 'given jurisdiction'; and domiciliaries of our State cannot 'renounce'
our laws and our control over them. To permit them to do so 'would be contrary
to our public policy in the protection of marriage and morality' of citizens of
our State . . . ,75 Although Judge Coleman did not insist upon domicile as the
basis for the court's jurisdiction, he did insist upon a link of some permanence,
actual or prospective, between the spouses and the sovereignty which assumes
to exercise power over them in relation to the marital status: "Questions of
jurisdiction of the foreign country ... are always open to examination, and we
must find that there was a link." 76 Without that link, no principle of comity
could validate a clearly void judgment.
Judge Coleman's views were relied on in part to declare invalid another Mexi-
can divorce only a few months later. In Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel"7 the divorce
before the court had been obtained under an alternative provision of the
Chihuahua law in which "residence" was deemed proven by the signing of a
Municipal Register. In spite of this color of jurisdiction, the court in Rosen-
70. Id. at 121-22.
71. 1 Misc. 2d 1049, 149 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
72. 41 Misc. 2d 95, 245 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
73. See discussion of Mexican law infra pp. 462-64.
74. 41 Misc. 2d at 100, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
75. Id. at 102, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
76. Id. at 101, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 808. This opinion gave rise to a flow of comment. See,
e.g., Berke, The Present Status of Mexican Divorces, 36 N.Y.S.B.J. 111 (1964); Ploscowe,
Mexican Divorces-When Are They Valid? 36 N.Y.S.B.J. 201 (1964); 32 Fordham L. Rev.
581 (1964); 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1531 (1964); 38 St. John's L. Rev. 164 (1963); 15 Syracuse
L. Rev. 765 (1964).
77. 43 Misc. 2d 462, 251 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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stiel conformed completely to the orthodox position: "Domicile as the sine qua
non requisite for jurisdiction to grant a divorce is rooted in the basic con-
cept of social rights and obligations in the marital res. The marriage con-
tract creates not only personal rights and obligations, but transcending these,
there arises a social-the State's interest in the marriage.'l s
On appeal, both cases were reversed by New York's Appellate Division. In
Rosenstiel,79 the appellate court pointed out that lack of domicile was not
fatal to a decree and that the public policy of the state as enunciated in Gould
v. Gould,8° Glaser v. Glaser5 ' and in Matter of Rlinclandcrs- was not
offended by it. The appellate division was unanimous in its reversal of the
lower court's decision in Rosenstiel. One judge dissented in WoodP equating
a divorce based on the submission of the parties to the court's jurisdiction
with a mail-order decree. He said: "This is abhorrent to our public policy
requiring jurisdiction of the marital res as a condition of giving effect to a
foreign divorce decree."' 4 It should be noted that the only difference between
the two divorces was that in Rosenstiel plaintiff signed a register, an act which
took several minutes, while in Wood the parties simply invoked an equally
valid provision of the Chihuahua law of divorce which makes signing of a
register unnecessary.
The incongruity of the recognition of these divorces in a state with a highly
restrictive domestic divorce policy was apparently not lost on the court in
Rosenstiel. It took pains to point out that decisions for more than a quarter
of a century indicated that these divorces were not offensive to the state's
public policy. And, it said, "it is significant that despite the continuing aware-
ness of those decisions in the field of law and in the community, the Legis-
lature has never sought to limit their doctrine."-' 3 It appears that if a different
78. Id. at 469-70, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
79. 21 App. Div. 2d 635, 253 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1st Dep't 1964). Both cases were heard
the same day and were decided together.
80. 235 N.Y. 14, 13S N.E. 490 (1923).
81. 276 N.Y. 296, 12 N.E.2d 305 (1938).
82. 290 N.Y. 31, 47 N.E.2d 681 (1943), which restated the New York rule: "It is
no part of the public policy of this State to refuse recognition to divorce decrees of
foreign states when rendered on the appearance of both parties, even when the parties
go from this State to the foreign state for the purpose of obtaining the decree and do
obtain it on grounds not recognized here." Id. at 36-37, 47 N.E2d at 6S4. As Justice Cole-
man pointed out in Wood, these decisions all dealt with situations which were dis-
tinguishable: Glaser and Rhinelander were Nevada divorce cases; Gould involved a
French divorce granted after protracted residence by the parties in France.
83. 22 App. Div. 2d 660, 253 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1st Dep't 1964) (per curiam).
84. Id. at 660, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 205 (dissenting opinion).
85. 21 App. Div. 2d at 63S, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 209. For an indication that there has
been some concern in legislative circles over the problem of migratory divorce, sce
Report of Joint Legislative Committee on Matrimonial and Family Law:s, N.Y. Leg. Doe.
No. 19, p. 147 (1961), which reproduced a study entitled: "Gresham's Law of Domestic
Relations: The Alabama Quickie"; and N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 32, p. 21 (1957).
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approach is ever to be taken in New York, it would have to be by way of
legislation.
VI. THE UNInom DIVoRCE RECOGNITION ACT
The problem of recognition of extrastate divorces has been handled in a
number of states by non-recognition statutes. The Massachusetts statute dates
from 1836.86 New Jersey, Maine and Wisconsin also legislated early to guar-
antee their control over the marriage status of their citizens.8 7 Following the
Williams decisions, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws drafted a uniform statute which was proposed for adoption by
the states in 1948. Called the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act,88 it pur-
ported to reflect the "public dissatisfaction which has arisen over the practice
of 'migratory divorce' . ... 89 The rationale of the Commissioners was "that
it is desirable to discourage rather than to encourage migration in pursuit of
a divorce; that specific statutory refusal to recognize extra-state divorces ob-
tained by domiciliaries of the state enacting the statute will reduce tourist
divorce-seeking . . . and that recognition to extrastate divorces obtained by
domiciliaries should be refused except as specifically required by the Consti-
tution of the United States .... "90
86. See Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 208, § 39 (1955): "A divorce decreed in another jurisdic-
tion according to the laws thereof by a court having jurisdiction of the cause and of
both the parties shall be valid and effectual in this commonwealth; but if an Inhabitant
of this commonwealth goes into another jurisdiction to obtain a divorce for a cause
occurring here while the parties resided here, or for a cause which would not authorize
a divorce by the laws of this commonwealth, a divorce so obtained shall be of no force
or effect in this commonwealth."
87. For a discussion of these statutes, see Merrill, The Utility of Divorce Recognition
Statutes in Dealing with the Problem of Migratory Divorce, 27 Texas L. Rev. 291,
301-03 (1949).
88. 9A U.LA. 278. Currently nine states incorporate the act in their statutes with
some minor variations in the text. They are California, Montana, Nebraska, New Hamp-
shire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin. Uniform
Divorce Recognition Act, 9A U.L.A. 178 (Supp. 1964). Louisiana, which adopted the
act in 1952, has since repealed it. La. Acts 1954, No. 616, § 1. Section 1 of the uniform act
states: "A divorce from the bonds of matrimony obtained in another jurisdiction shall be of
no force or effect in this state, if both parties to the marriage were domiciled in this
state at the time the proceeding for the divorce was commenced." 9A U.LA. 278. Section 2
states: "Proof that a person obtaining a divorce from the bonds of matrimony in another
jurisdiction was (a) domiciled in this state within 12 months prior to the commencement
of the proceeding therefor, and resumed residence in this state within 18 months after
the date of his departure therefrom, or (b) at all times after his departure from this
state and until his return maintained a place of residence within this state, shall be
prima facie evidence that the person was domiciled in this state when the divorce pro-
ceeding was commenced." 9A U.L.A. 284.
89. Commissioners' Note, 9A U.LA.. 275.
90. Id. at 276.
The act was no sooner adopted by the state of Washington in 194901 than
commentators were urging its repeal.Y2 It was suggested that since under the
act no divorce granted in another jurisdiction would have "any force or effect"
in the state of domicile, anyone could attack a migratory divorce "regardless
of how inequitable it may be to permit him to do so. 2 3
However, the history of the act since its adoption does not bear out the
fears of the author of that statement0 4 In California, where the act has been
invoked most frequently, the doctrine of estoppel has been applied in a num-
ber of cases to preclude an attack on an otherwise patently invalid divorce.P
It is a rare case where the act has been invoked to invalidate a divorce ob-
tained in a foreign country. Thus, since the courts are dealing mostly with
sister-state decrees which automatically entail the requirements of full faith
and credit, their tendency is to hold that in the case before them the act
has no application,90 and is in fact, superfluous. The Nebraska Supreme Court,
in Zenker v. ZenkerO7 passing on the act's constitutionality, and sustaining
the statute, commented on the United States Supreme Court decisions and
confined them strictly to the narrow facts of each case.00 So, in Zenher, where
the husband claimed that his wife had obtained personal service upon him
in Colorado by fraudulently enticing him into the state, the Nebraska court
held that since the wife had no bona fide domicile in Colorado, and the
personal jurisdiction over defendant husband was obtained by fraud, Nebraska
did not have to give full faith and credit to the Colorado decree.93
It has been suggested that the act's impact in California has been "practically
nil" since the same result is being reached under it as under the common lawY0
In Nevin v. Nevin,"°1 the Rhode Island court has intimated that the act may
have no application except to e% parte decrees.'1 Montana, the last state to
adopt the act (1963),103 uses the words "em parte" in the text, though the
91. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 26.08.200-.210 (1961).
92. See Marsh, The Uniform Divorce Recognition Act: Sections 20 and 21 of the
Divorce Act of 1949, 24 Wash. L. Rev. 259 (1949).
93. Id. at 270.
94. See 43 Calif. L. Rev. SS1 (1955).
95. See, e.g., Dietrich v. Dietrich, 41 Cal. 2d 497, 261 P.2d 269 (1953); Solley v.
Solley, 227 Adv. Cal. App. 572, 38 Cal. Rptr. 802 (Dist. CL App. 1964); Estate of Vinson,
212 Cal. App. 2d 543, 28 Cal. Rptr. 94 (Dist. CL App. 1963).
96. See, e.g., Estate of Vinson, supra note 95, at 543, 23 CaL Rptr. at 93.
97. 161 Neb. 200, 72 N.W.2d S09 (1955).
98. Id. at 216, 72 N.W.2d at 819.
99. Id. at 217, 72 N.W.2d at S19.
100. Note, 16 Hastings L.. 121, 129 (1964).
101. 8S RJ. 426, 149 A.2d 722 (1959).
102. Id. at 435, 149 A.2d at 726. The second section of the Rhode lahnd statute is
captioned "Ex parte divorce in another state between parties resident in this state."
R.I Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 15-6-1 to -4 (1956). The court here was considering section 5
of the Act.
103. Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 21-150 (Supp. 1963).
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uniform version does not. In these instances, the act is merely a codification
of case law though it was undoubtedly with a view toward deterring the at-
tempt to obtain a foreign divorce that the act was adopted. 10 4
VII. THE MEXICAN LAW
It would be presumptuous to attempt an exhaustive review of "Mexican"
law here. But if the status theory of divorce has any validity at all in this
country, questions are inevitably raised when a divorce is granted in a forum
whose theory of jurisdiction is not even remotely similar to ours. As stated
by Judge Coleman in Wood v. Wood,10 5 the right of Mexican courts to act
in any way they deem proper upon the status of their own citizens is not
denied. But, in his view, their attempt to adjudicate the status of a foreign
citizen was outside their power. It has been pointed out that under principles
of private international law a man's status is always governed by the law of
his nationality. 10 6 Thus it would appear that under these principles, unless
there exists a jurisdictional tie to the divorcing forum similar to that which
would be required at his domicile, his status could not be altered in a foreign
forum.
Mexico, like the United States, is a federation of states, each with its own
laws, but subject to a federal constitution. The Mexican Constitution has a
full faith and credit clause,10 7 which requires that each state give effect to
the decrees of its sisters. Unlike the United States, however, the determination
of a constitutional question brought by an aggrieved party will be effective
only as to him. 08 Not until a question is passed on five times by the Supreme
Court of Mexico will it become jurisprudencia and become binding on all courts
in Mexico. 0 9 This is a particularly interesting factor in appraising the situa-
tion in Mexico with regard to "quickie divorces" which are available to
Mexicans and foreigners alike in its more liberal jurisdictions.110
Historically, Mexico rejected the idea of absolute divorce. It was not until
the enactment of the Law of Family Relations in 1917 that this concept was
introduced. From the outset its application was more "liberal" than that of
any of the states of North America."' The Civil Code for the Federal District
104. See Stumberg, The Migratory Divorce, 33 Wash. L. Rev. 331, 341 (1958).
105. 41 Misc. 2d 95, 100, 245 N.Y.S.2d 800, 807 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (dissenting opinion).
106. See Franco, The Rosenstiel Case, N.Y.L.J., June 19, 1964, p. 1, col. 5.
107. Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos art. 121.
108. This proceeding is called an "amparo." For a discussion of the different ap-
proaches of Mexico and the United States to judicial review, see Cabrera & Headrick, Notes
on judicial Review in Mexico and the United States, 5 Inter-American L. Rev. 253, 255
(1963).
109. Stern, Mexican Divorces-The Mexican Law, 7 Prac. Law., May 1961, p. 78, at 81.
110. E.g., Campeche, Chihuahua, Tlaxcala, Morelos, and Sonora.
111. For a discussion of the historical development of divorce legislation in Mexico,
see Ireland & Galindez, Divorce in the Americas 192-94 (1947). The authors note that
the divorce of a Mexican obtained abroad will be valid if the spouse actually resided in
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and Territories (the divorce provisions of which have been adopted by a num-
ber of states) 1" provides for two types of divorce: voluntario and contencioso.
In a contested divorce for a given cause, the action may be brought by the
innocent spouse within six months of learning of the cause. 1" 3 If there has
been pardon or condonation by the plaintiff, he may not bring the suit.j"
Express provision is made for reconciliation" 3 i and the plaintiff may stop the
action at any time and oblige his spouse to reunite with him." 0
Though divorce by mutual consent is listed as one of seventeen grounds
for divorce in the Code,11 7 special procedural provisions apply to it. If there
are no children of the marriage, a simple method is available which has been
compared to the Soviet system. The parties establish by certificate that they
are of full age and that they have disposed of their conjugal property; mani-
fest their wish to be divorced before an official of the Civil Registry; and
fifteen days later, having ratified the divorce petition, are declared divorced.
This procedure is not available unless the marriage has existed for one year
prior to the petition for divorce., 8
It should be noted that the concept of domicile exists in Mexico and is
defined in much the same terms as it is in the United States." The divorce
law of Chihuahua,' ° however, completely bypasses the concept of domicile
in setting up its own separate and distinct procedural requirements for divorce.
That law sets up alternative provisions for fixing the "competence" of the
court to grant a divorce. Article 23 states that express or tacit submission
to the court with a clear renunciation of the parties' own forum fixes the
competence of the court. Article 22 declares that the judge competent to take
cognizance of the divorce is the one of the place of residence of the plaintiff
and, according to Article 24, such "residence" shall be proved by the signing
the country when the divorce was obtained. Id. at 205. See also Summers, The Divorce
Laws of lIexico, 2 Law & Contemp. Prob. 310-12 (1935).
112. Baja California, Coahuila, Colima, Chiapas, Guerrero, Nayarit, Nuevo Le6n,
Querntaro, San Luis Potosi, Sinaloa, Tabasco, Veracruz. See Aguilar Guti&rTe & Dhbez
Muro, Panorama de la Legislaci6n Civil de Mexico 33 (1960).
113. Nuevo C6digo Civil para el Distrito y Territoros Federales art. 273 (Andrade,
10th ed. 1952) (Mlex.).
114. Nuevo Cddigo Civil para e Distrito y Territorios Federales art. 279 (Andrade,
10th ed. 1952) (Alex.).
115. Nuevo Cddigo Civil para e Distrito y Territorios Federals art. 2Z0 (Andrade,
10th ed. 1952) (lex.).
116. Nuevo C6digo Civil para e Distrito y Territorios Federales art. 231 (Andrade,
10th ed. 1952) (Mlex.).
117. Nuevo C6digo Civil para el Distrito y Territorios Federales art. 267 (Andrade,
10th ed. 1952) (Alex.).
118. Ireland & Galindez, op. cit. supra note 111, at 19q9.
119. See, e.g., Nuevo C6digo Civil para e Distrito y Territorios Federales art. 29
(Andrade, 10th ed. 1952) (lex.).
120. Ley de Divordo para e E.L. y S. de Chihuahua (1933), CoUecci6n do Leye
Mlexicanas, Serie: Leyes del Estado de Chihuahua 259-67 (Cajica 1955).
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of the Municipal Register. 12 1 Another provision, obviously designed to appeal
to foreigners, is the article which provides that the woman may resume the
use of her maiden name after the decree is granted. 2 2 Since in Mexico a
woman always retains her maiden name (to which she adds the name of her
husband) this provision is meaningless to a Mexican. The effect of the liberal
divorce laws in Mexico has been to increase the coffers of the state since fees
are charged for each of the steps, and to bring forth anguished cries from
responsible jurists.'23
It has been suggested that no state in Mexico has jurisdiction over the
status of foreigners, by virtue of Article 50 of the Law of Immigration and
Nationality which requires that their status be dealt with according to the
law of the Federal District. 2 4 Only one case has been reported in which a
proceeding was brought on those grounds.'2 5 There, the Supreme Court held
a Yucatan divorce invalid under this section. This decision, however, under
rules of jurisprudencia, is not binding on other courts. It also has been pointed
out'2 6 that the court in that case noted that participation in a state proceeding
by a party would amount to a waiver of his right to later question the de-
cree.
12 7
VIII. CONCLUSION
Though it appears that most state courts are "likely to refuse recognition
to any extranational divorce not founded on the plaintiff's domicile, 1 2 8 re-
gardless of the appearance of both parties, there is much to be said for a
strong public policy expressed by the legislature against migratory divorce.
The paucity of cases involving Mexican divorces in states where the Uniform
Divorce Recognition Act has been adopted may indicate, not that the act's
impact has been nil,'2 9 but that the statement of policy has had the desired
deterrent effect.
121. It has been suggested that under Mexican Supreme Court decisions founding
jurisdiction on domicile "this provision of the law of Chihuahua would seem to be un-
constitutional and violative of due process." Stern, supra note 109, at 82.
122. Ley de Divorcio para el E.L. y S. de Chihuahua art. 10 (1933), Colleccl6n do
Leyes Mexicanas, Serie: Leyes del Estado de Chihuahua 261 (Cajica 1955).
123. See, e.g., Siqueiros, Los Conflictos de Leyes en el Sistema Constitucional Mexicano
80 (1957).
124. de Vries, International Recognition of Migratory Divorce, N.Y.LJ., April 21,
1964, p. 1, col. 4.
125. Amparo Frieda Tauchnitz Ermuthe Johanna, 50 Semanario Judicial de ]a Federa-
d6n, Part I, 554 (Oct. 22, 1936).
126. de Vries, supra note 124, at 1, col. 5.
127. Were it not for the factor of waiver in this type of situation, it might well be
that New York is giving effect to divorces which have no validity in their own country.
Not only are the most minimal North American standards being disregarded, but the
Mexican law, itself, is being ignored.
128. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 243 (1959).
129. But see Note, 16 Hastings L.J. 121, 129 (1964); note 100 supra and accompanying
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The adoption of the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act, with emphasis on
extranational, rather than sister-state divorces, would be beneficial for states
that do not now have a non-recognition statute. For states that have con-
sistently denied effect to these divorces, the act would be a codification and
reaffirmation of case law. If properly worded-to specifically deny effect to
a decree where there was no jurisdiction of the marital status-such a statute
would preclude a problem for the courts where personal jurisdiction was
pressed as a substitute for jurisdiction of the marriage.
For a state like New York, adoption of such a statute would be a reversal
of judicial policy, which, though consistent with precedent, has permitted
an "evasion of our laws" which so concerned the court in Jackson v. JachsonFz c
It has been pointed out that "the easier it is made for those who through
affluence are able to exercise disproportionately large influence on legislation,
to obtain migratory divorces, the less likely it is that the divorce laws of their
home States will be liberalized, insofar as that is deemed desirable, so as
to affect all.' 131
If, as has been suggested, a liberal judicial policy of recognition of Mexican
decrees is the "compensating factor" which makes New York's ancient and
highly restrictive divorce policy tolerable,13 2 surely the courts are facilitating
evasion of the law by abetting such escape. If a remedy to what is regarded
by some as intolerable is to be found, should it not be made available to
every citizen rather than only to those who can afford the round-trip fare
to Mexico? It is submitted that the disrespect for state law that is fostered
by a policy of allowing that law to be judicially circumvented is an evil in itself.
If New York were to adopt a non-recognition statute, a primary consideration
would undoubtedly be its retroactivity. Such a statute should be prospective to
avoid the inevitable multiplicity of suits to determine legitimacy of children or
the status of parties to a prior Mexican divorce. To avoid the anomaly of
a "marriage at will" as noted in Rosenstiel,1' parties to such a decree could
be estopped to deny its validity in an appropriate case.134
The primary goal of the non-recognition laws is the assurance that the
divorcing forum has some legitimate interest in the marriage status before
assuming to act upon it. 35 Whether that interest be e.xpressed in terms of
130. 1 Johns. R. 424, 432 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1S06).
131. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 370 n.18 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dizenting).
132. Foster, New York's Divorce Laws-A Re-evaluation May Now Be in Order,
N.Y-.LJ., June 24, 1964, p. 4, col. 1.
133. 21 App. Div. 2d 635, 639, 253 N.Y.S.2d 205, 210 (Ist Dep't 1964) (concurring
opinion).
134. See Note, Enforcement by Estoppel of Divorces Without Domicil: Toward a
Uniform Divorce Recognition Act, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 326 (1943).
135. Indications are that "pure" domicile may not be the prerequisite. See Scott v.
Scott, 31 Cal. 2d 249, 254, 331 P.2d 641, 644 (1953) (Traynor, J., concurring). Justice
Traynor stated: "This court has never expressly ruled on the question whether a finding
of domicile is prerequisite to the recognition in this state of a divorce decree rendered
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